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Comment
After Louboutin: Responding to Trademark
Ownership of Color in Creative Contexts

"I found I could say things with color and shapes that I couldn't say any
other way ...things I had no words for."
Georgia O'Keeffe'
As an artist, it would be difficult to complete a work of art if you were
limited to the use of certain colors, only those colors that no other artist
had claimed. Imagine, for instance, that Monet, upon completion of his
water lilies, is sued by Picasso for using a certain shade of blue.'
Picasso claims that the blue used by Monet is the same blue he uses to
express melancholy.3 In fact, Picasso has used that blue throughout a
number of his paintings, and it has become somewhat of a theme in his
work.4 Should Picasso have ownership of that shade of blue?'
Fashion designers, artists, filmmakers, and architects alike "share a
dependence on color as an indispensable medium." Color is expressive;
it serves to "depict the idea" of the creator.7 Color serves to translate
what a creator seeks to communicate to others. Despite the importance
of color in the creative process, courts have allowed single colors to serve
as trademarks under certain circumstances. For instance, the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit have recognized trademarks for a green-gold color used

1. 2 NANCY H. REILY, GEORGIA OKEEFFE, A PRIVATE FRIENDSHIP 379 (Sunstone Press
2009).
2. Christian Louboutin SA. v. Yves St. Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd in part, No. 11-3303-cv, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).

3. Id.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 452.
7. Id.
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by a manufacturer on dry cleaning press pads and a shade of pink used
on insulation.8
But is trademark registration of color inappropriate in certain artistic
contexts?
Specifically, should single-color marks be eligible for
trademark protection in the fashion industry, "one of the world's most
important creative industries?"9
The answer to this question is
significant in the fashion industry where "visual impact is of the utmost
importance." ° While there should not be a per se rule against such
trademarks, single-color marks in the fashion context are inherently
suspect."
This Comment asserts that the trademark doctrine of
aesthetic functionality may provide protection for the creative use of
color in fashion. In certain circumstances, as Judge Posner stated
simply, "[b]eauty is function," and when functionality is present, no
trademark protection is warranted. 2 This Comment also asserts that
the trademark concept of secondary meaning may serve as a check to the
broad availability of color mark registration. If courts take a hard-line
approach on what is required to prove secondary meaning, only those
owners who have truly cultivated their color marks, and successfully
created an association between their marks and the source of their
marks in the minds of the public, will succeed in obtaining trademark
protection.
I.

TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF COLOR MARKS

A trademark is any "word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person, or which a person has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish his or her
goods ...from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the

8. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995); In re Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (1985).
9. Darrell G. Mottley, Navigating FashionLaw: Leading Lawyers on Exploring the
Trends, Cases, and Strategies of Fashion Law: The Tools for Protecting Fashion Law
Clients, ASPATORE (Jan. 2012), at *1. The importance of the industry is reflected in the fact
that the women's fashion industry is a multibillion-dollar business annually. Id.
10. Charles E. Colman, Navigating FashionLaw: Leading Lawyers on Exploring the
Trends, Cases, and Strategies of FashionLaw: An Overview of IntellectualPropertyIssues
Relevant to the FashionIndustry, ASPATORE (Jan. 2012), at *41.
11. Kari Heyison, If It's Not Ripped, Why Sew It? An Analysis of Why Enhanced
Intellectual PropertyProtectionfor FashionDesign is in PoorTaste, 28 ToURO L. REV. 255,
266 ("The Supreme Court's discussion in Qualitex is inadequate when applied to the
fashion industry. Trademarking colors in the fashion industry would 'significantly hinder
competition' in an industry where color is a fundamental and functional feature.").
12. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene & Keene Mfg., 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985).
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source of the goods .... ,,13 Trademarks serve to protect consumers
from deception and confusion, ensuring that consumers receive the
products they intend to purchase. 4 Trademarks also serve to protect
an owner's cultivation of, and investment in a source-identifying
product." 5 Trademarks are of particular importance in the fashion
industry because the other intellectual property regimes, copyright and
patent law, offer designers very limited protection. 6
Trademarks in the fashion industry commonly take the form of logos
and insignia.17 Designers often incorporate these protected marks into
their designs."8 Classic examples of such registered marks include
Louis Vuitton's Toile monogram, 9 Burberry's plaid,20 and Gucci's
green-red-green stripe. 21 However, in 2008, a designer applied for and
successfully registered a more unconventional mark-a color.2 Famed
shoe designer Christian Louboutin registered a trademark that claimed
exclusive use of the color red for the outsoles of the shoes he designs.2
Unsurprisingly, it only took a few years for this mark to become a hot
source of litigation.24 While trademark law provided the District Court
for the Southern District of New York with some guidance on the issue,
the validity of single-color marks was an issue of first impression in the
context of the fashion industry. For that reason, it is important to look
at the history of single-color marks in general, prior to examining color
trademarks in the fashion industry.

13. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Trademark law is both federal and state law. Colman,
supra note 10, at *1.
14. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).

15. Id.
16. Danielle E. Gorman, Protecting Single Color Trademarks In Fashion After
Louboutin, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 395-98 (2012). However, some argue that
designers need a blend of copyright, trademark, and patent protection in order to
adequately protect their creations. Mottley, supra note 9, at *8.
17. Sunilla Sreepada, The New Black: Trademark ProtectionFor Color Marks In The
FashionIndustry, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1131, 1137 (2009).
18. Id. at 1137.
19. Registration No. 1,653,663.
20.

Registration No. 1,241,222.

21. Registration No. 1,122,780.
22. CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN'S RED OUTSOLES, Registration No. 3,361,597.
23. Id.
24. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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In General: "Color... Its Own Animal "'s
The issue of whether color is eligible for trademark protection was
addressed as early as 1906.26 In A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v.
Broderick & Bascom Rope Co.,27 the United States Supreme Court
made the following landmark statement on the issue: '"hether mere
color can constitute a valid trademark may admit of doubt. Doubtless
it may, if it be impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square,
triangle, a cross, or a star. But the authorities do not go farther than
this."28 Despite the fact that the Court's statement was made in dicta, it
became controlling on the issue of color trademarks. 29 The Court's
statement sparked a sort of prohibition era in which the courts and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused trademark
A.

protection for single-color marks.3°

However, in a few instances, courts used common law unfair competition principles to protect the use of color.31 For example, in Yellow Cab
Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co.,3 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that while a defendant cab
company had no exclusive right to the use of the color yellow, it was
entitled to trademark protection for the color so long as it could establish
secondary meaning.3 3 Still, cases like Yellow Cab were rare following
the Court's powerful dicta in A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., and protection
for the use of color was sparse.
The icy treatment of single-color marks did not change much until the
passage of the federal trademark statutory scheme, the Trademark Act
of 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the "Lanham Act").' The passage
of the Lanham Act resulted in a broad revision of trademark law.35
The Lanham Act broadly defined trademark as "'any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by others."36 In the past, registration

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Colman, supra note 10, at *41.
A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166 (1906).
201 U.S. 166 (1906).
Id. at 171.
Gorman, supra note 16, at 374.
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1118-19.
147 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1945).
Id. at 415.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006).
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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was limited to "technical" common law trademarks.3 7 On the contrary,
the Lanham Act provided that registration should not be refused on
account of the nature of the mark unless one of the specific exceptions,
set forth in the statute, applied. 38
In light of the passage of the Lanham Act, courts began to depart from
the dicta of A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., and registration became
available in many circumstances where it was previously excluded,
including the registration of color trademarks. 9 For instance, in In re
40
Hehr Manufacturing,
the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that a square red label could be registered as a trademark
since the label distinguished and identified the owner's goods.41
Gradually, the prohibition on the use of color marks dissolved and courts
started to look at the facts of each color mark case individually.4 2
During this period, the registration of color marks simply depended upon
meeting the legal requirements for registration, and courts took into
account the "nature of the goods, how the color [was] used, the number
of colors or color combinations available, the number of competitors, and
customary marketing practices.' t 3
The increase in the registration of color trademarks following the
passage of the Lanham Act also resulted in an increase of litigation
challenging such marks. As cases on color trademarks were handed
down, a number of common arguments developed as justifications for
denying trademark protection of color marks. 44 These arguments are
worth noting. Among these are the color depletion theory, the shade
confusion theory, and the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. 45 The
color depletion theory is based on the argument that if you give a
plaintiff exclusive rights to a single color, you are effectively giving that
plaintiff a monopoly in that color." Consequently, if single-color marks
are granted, eventually no color will be available for competitors to
use.47 In a famous color depletion theory case, Campbell Soup Co. v.

37. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006).
39. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119-20.
40. 279 F.2d 526 (CCPA 1960).
41. Id. at 527-28.
42. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120.
43. Id.
44. Gorman, supra note 16, at 376.
45. Id.
46. Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 797-98 (3d Cir. 1949). Gorman,
supra note 16, at 377.
47. Campbell Soup Co., 175 F.2d at 797-98.
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Armour & Co.,48 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit denied plaintiff Campbell Soup Company's motion for an
injunction to stop defendant Armour & Company from using red and
white labels.49 In refusing the injunction, the court of appeals noted,
"If they may thus monopolize red in all of its shades the next manufacturer may monopolize orange in all its shades and the next5yellow
in the
°
same way. Obviously, the list of colors will soon run out."
Another argument against trademark protection for color marks is the
shade confusion theory. The premise of the shade confusion theory is
that differences in colors can be slight and difficult to discern.5 ' The
concern at the heart of the shade confusion theory is that trademark
infringement actions will "denigrate into questions of shade confu52
sion.
A third justification for denying trademark protection of color marks
is the doctrine of functionality.53 There are two forms of functionality
that may serve as affirmative defenses in trademark infringement
claims-utilitarian (or traditional) functionality and aesthetic functionality.54 Utilitarian functionality is present when a product feature is
either "(1) essential to the use or purpose of the article, or ... (2) affects
the cost or quality of the article."55 If there is a finding of utilitarian
functionality, a product is generally ineligible for trademark protection.56 Even without a finding of utilitarian functionality, a product
feature may still be deemed functional if there is a finding of aesthetic
functionality; that is, the aesthetic design of the product is "itself the
mark for which protection is sought" and the registration of the product
would put competitors at a disadvantage.5 7
The above-mentioned arguments achieved some success in postLanham Act color trademark cases. However, one still could not predict
when such defenses would be successful, as the law on color marks
remained muddy even after the passage of the Lanham Act. The
"uncertain ground" of single-color trademarks did not become more
certain until 1985, when the United States Court of Appeals for the

48. 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1949).
49. Id. at 796, 799.
50. Id. at 798.
51. Gorman, supra note 16, at 379.
52. Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 97 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
53. Gorman, supra note 16, at 382.
54. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., No. 11-3303-cv., 2012 WL
3832285, at *7 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
55. Id. at *8 (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Federal Circuit decided In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.58 In that
case, the Federal Circuit was faced with the issue of whether OwensComing Fiberglas Corporation could register the color pink, as used on
the insulation material it sold, as a trademark.5 9 The court held that
Owens-Corning's pink could be registered as a trademark because the
use of the color did not perform a non-trademark function and indicated
Owens-Corning as the origin of the goods. 60 The court observed that
the law had developed in a way such that so long as a mark was
"capable of being or becoming distinctive of [the] applicant's goods in
commerce," it was capable of serving as a trademark.6 1
The next landmark case addressing trademark protection for color,
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,62 was decided just ten years
later. The issue in Qualitex, per Justice Breyer, was whether the
Lanham Act permitted the registration of a "trademark that consists,
purely and simply, of a color."'
Qualitex, a manufacturer of dry
cleaning press pads, obtained registration for the green-gold color it used
on its press pads. Qualitex subsequently sued Jacobson, a competitor, for
using the green-gold color claiming unfair competition and trademark
infringement. The United States District Court for the Central District
of California found in favor of Qualitex on both claims. However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment on the trademark infringement claim determining the Lanham Act did not permit the registration of color, standing
alone, as a trademark.64
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals,
rejecting the court of appeals holding that trademark protection is not
available for color.65 The Supreme Court held that no special rule
barring color from serving as a trademark existed.66 In the Court's
opinion, Justice Breyer noted, 'Ve cannot find in the basic objectives of
trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone
as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and
therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand ... ."67 In
addressing the functionality defense, Justice Breyer stated, "color alone,

58. Id. at *5; see also Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
59. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118.
60. Id. at 1123.
61. Id. at 1120.
62. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
63. Id. at 160-61.
64. Id. at 161.
65. Id. at 162.
66. Id. at 174.
67. Id. at 163.
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at least sometimes, can meet the basic legal requirements for use as a
trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm's goods and
identifies their source, without serving any other significant function." 8
In sum, the Court held that so long as a color had acquired secondary
meaning, and served no non-trademark function, it would be eligible for
trademark protection.69
The Court's holding in Qualitex finally brought resolve to the issue of
whether a color was eligible for trademark protection. ° Unsurprisingly,
after the Qualitex decision, a number of single-color trademarks were
registered. Among the single-color trademarks registered, were the
brown used by United Parcel Service (UPS), the canary yellow of
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.'s (MMM) sticky notes, and the
robin's egg blue used by Tiffany and Company.7
B.

In the Fashion Industry
Prior to Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America,
Inc.,72 the validity of single-color trademarks in the context of the
fashion industry had never been examined.73 Nevertheless, color was
a key component of industry marks that were afforded trademark
protection.7 4 Still, registration of color trademarks, in the fashion
context, was limited to the use of color "in distinct patterns or combinations of shades that manifest a conscious effort to design a uniquely
identifiable mark embedded in the goods."75 Trademark protection did
not extend to a single color. Rather, trademark protection was only
afforded when an arrangement of colors worked together to create a
"distinct recognizable image."76
An example of the treatment of a color mark in the fashion industry
can be found in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc.7 In

68. Id. at 166.
69.

Id.

70. ChristianLouboutin S.A, 2012 WL 3832285, at *7. Prior to Qualitex, there was a
split among the circuit courts. Some circuits had allowed registration of color marks while
others refused to extend registration to the same. Daniel I. Schloss, Marks of Distinction:
Rethinking Secondary Meaning Standardsin Trademark Law After Qualitex v. Jacobson,
14 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695, 695 (1996).
71. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:44.50 (4th ed. 2012).
72. 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
73. Id. at 451; Sreepada, supra note 17, at 1135.
74. Sreepada, supra note 17, at 1135.
75. ChristianLouboutin S.A., 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
76. Id.
77. 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Louis Vuitton, French design giant Louis Vuitton brought an action
against American handbag designer and retailer Dooney & Bourke,
alleging trademark infringement and dilution. The basis of Louis
Vuitton's claim was that a bag marketed by Dooney & Bourke, the "ItBag," infringed on Louis Vuitton's multicolored trademark, which
consisted of the designer's traditional LV pattern, in thirty-three
different colors, on a white or black background. The District Court for
the Southern District of New York denied Louis Vuitton's motion for a
preliminary injunction on the ground that there was no likelihood of
confusion between the two bags at issue. Even still, the district court
acknowledged that Louis Vuitton's mark was a distinctive mark that had
obtained secondary meaning. 8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined that Louis Vuitton's multicolored mark was both original
and inherently distinctive.7 9 The court noted that the LV pattern itself,
the "Toile pattern," had served as an indicator of the French firm for
over a century.80 Ultimately, the court of appeals agreed with the
district court's finding that the multicolored mark had acquired
secondary meaning.8 Consequently, Louis Vuitton's multicolored mark
merited protection. 2
Another example of a dispute involving a color mark in the fashion
industry can be found in Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc." In that
case, Burberry, a high-end British fashion brand, sued multiple
defendants for trademark infringement, along with a number of other
claims. Burberry alleged the defendants were using Burberry's marks
on various clothing items the defendants were selling. One of the
trademarks involved in the dispute was Burberry's plaid check mark."
The written description of the mark reads: "The designated colors are a
feature of the mark and the colors and shades of colors are light tan,
dark tan, light brown, dark brown, black, white, very dark red, dark red,
medium red, light red, dark grey, medium grey and light grey." 5 In
resolving the case, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined Burberry's colored plaid mark was a
valid trademark and entitled to protection.86

78. Id. at 112-13.
79. Id. at 116.
80.

Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
No. 08-Civ-5781, 2009 WL 1675080 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009).
Id. at *1-4.
BURBERRY PLAID MARK, Registration No. 1,241,222.

86. Burberry Ltd., 2009 WL 1675080, at *5.
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A more recent example of a dispute involving a color mark in the
fashion context is Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, Inc. 7 As is typically
the case in such disputes, Gucci involved a trademark infringement
claim between two fashion heavyweights. In this case, Gucci brought a
claim against Guess for infringing upon several of Gucci's trademarks.
One of the Gucci marks at issue was a stripe comprised of three
colors." The written description of the trademark reads: 'The mark is
made up of a stripe containing three distinct bands of colors, the colors
being green, red then green." 9 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York found Gucci's tri-color mark to be valid and
"entitled to the strictest protection."9" The recognition of the validity
of the trademark at issue in Gucci America, Inc., as well as in Burberry,
Ltd. and Louis Vuitton Malletier, signaled that courts were willing to
allow fashion designers to protect marks with significant color components. The courts' recognition of the validity of such color-heavy marks
paved the way for designers to take their intellectual property portfolios
one step further and obtain protection for their single-color marks.
II.

THE LOUBOUTIN CASE

The decision in Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent,
America, Inc.9 1 marked the first time the validity of single-color
trademarks in the fashion industry was addressed.92 The parties in
Christian Louboutin were both French fashion design heavyweights.
Christian Louboutin, the person, along with the corporate entities that
make up his fashion house, initiated the action against Yves Saint
Laurent (YSL), a French "fashion institution." Christian Louboutin is a
designer specializing in high fashion women's shoes. His shoes entered
the fashion market in 1992. Somewhere around that time, Louboutin
began using a glossy red lacquer on the outsoles of his shoes. Louboutin's shoes have since grown in popularity, even garnering success on an
international level, with the help of celebrities and fashionistas alike.93
In March 2007, Louboutin filed an application with the USPTO to
obtain trademark protection for his stand-out red soles. In January
2008, the USPTO granted the trademark.94 The written description for

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

No. 09-Civ-4373 (SAS), 2012 WL 2304247 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012).
Id. at *1.
Gucci's GREEN-RED-GREEN STRIPE, Registration No. 1,122,780.
Gucci, 2012 WL 2304247, at *25.
778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See Sreepada, supra note 17, at 1135.
ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *2.
Id.
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Louboutin's trademark read: 'The color(s) red is/are claimed as a feature
of the mark. The mark consists of a lacquered red sole on footwear."9 5
The description of Louboutin's mark also included a diagram, showing
the placement of the color on the shoe. 96
In January 2011, Louboutin learned that YSL was marketing and
selling a monochrome red shoe (a red shoe with a red insole, red heel,
red upper, and red outsole). Shortly thereafter, Louboutin contacted
YSL and requested that YSL stop selling any shoes with red outsoles.
The parties subsequently entered into negotiations in hopes to avoid
litigation on the matter. Unfortunately, the negotiations were unsuccessful.9"
In April 2011, Louboutin filed an action against YSL in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Louboutin
asserted a number of claims under the Lanham Act (trademark
infringement, counterfeiting, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and trademark dilution), as well as state law claims (trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, and unlawful
deceptive acts and practices).
Additionally, Louboutin sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent YSL from marketing shoes with red
soles, similar to those described in Louboutin's trademark, during the
litigation period.9"
In response, YSL asserted two counterclaims against Louboutin. In
the first, YSL sought the cancellation of Louboutin's mark on the
grounds that the mark was not distinctive, it was functional and
ornamental, and it was secured by fraud. In the second, YSL sought
damages for tortious interference with business relations and unfair
competition. Following a short period of discovery, the parties argued
the preliminary injunction motion.99
In examining the case, the district court noted the novel issue at hand
was "whether there is something unique about the fashion world that
militates against extending trademark protection to a single color."' °
The district court began its analysis with a recitation of the Supreme
Court's holding in Qualitex-that a color can meet the legal requirements for trademark protection so long as it distinguishes the goods,
identifies their source, and does not serve any other function. The court
then addressed the affirmative defense of aesthetic functionality. The

95. Id.; CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN RED OUTSOLES, Registration No. 3,361,597.
96. ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *2.

97. Id. at *2-3.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id.
100.

Id. (quoting ChristianLouboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451).
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district court determined that in the context of the fashion industry,
single-color trademarks are inherently functional.''
The district court based its determination that single-color trademarks
are inherently functional on the nature of the fashion industry itself.10'
Specifically, the court stated that color is not used in fashion in the same
way it is used in other industries, such as in the manufacture of wall
insulation or dry cleaning press pads. 3 This is because in the context
of fashion trademarks, color does not serve solely to identify the source
of the mark. 4 Rather, color is used in fashion designs "primarily to
advance expressive, ornamental and aesthetic purposes."0 5 The court
noted that unlike other industries, the fashion industry is unique in that
production is dictated by season, taste, aesthetics, and creativity.106
Since the district court found that single-color marks are inherently
functional in the context of the fashion industry, any such registered
marks were invalid. 7 In light of the invalidity of single-color marks
used in the fashion industry, the district court determined Louboutin
would not be able to prove that his mark was eligible for trademark
protection.'
Since Louboutin was unable to show a likelihood of
success on the merits, a prerequisite for the granting of a preliminary
injunction, the district court denied Louboutin's motion for a preliminary
injunction. 0 9
On appeal, Louboutin argued the district court erred in its application
of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, in failing to give weight to the
statutory presumption of validity as the mark was registered, in
conducting an improper analysis of trademark infringement and dilution,
and in ignoring the proof of likelihood of confusion and irreparable harm
that was offered."0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reviewed the decision of the district court under an abuse of
discretion standard."' The court of appeals examined the issue in two
stages: First, the court looked at whether single-color marks were
protectable in trademark and second, the court addressed the doctrine

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
ChristianLouboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
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of aesthetic functionality. 112 After making determinations in those two
stages, the court turned to whether Louboutin's red sole trademark was
valid." 3
In discussing the issue of whether single-color marks are eligible for
trademark protection, the court of appeals determined that Qualitex had
already provided the answer to this query by holding that trademark
protection is available for color."" Thus, the court began its analysis
5
In
at the second stage-addressing the doctrine of functionality."
examining functionality, the court again relied on the Qualitex decision
in stating the general rule of functionality in trademark law-aspects or
features of a product that are functional cannot serve as a trademark."6 The court then turned to the application of the functionality
doctrine in the fashion context." 7 The court determined that there
was no per se rule of functionality for color marks in the fashion
industry."' Furthermore, the court noted that the district court's per
se rule was out of line with the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex,
which "specifically forbade the implementation of a per se rule that
would deny protection for the use of a single color as a trademark in a
particular industrial context."" 9
After concluding no per se rule of functionality controlled, the court
turned to the trademark at issue.o'° The court first decided whether
the mark was distinctive, and second, whether the allegedly infringing
use of the mark was likely to cause consumer confusion.'' In examining the validity of Louboutin's mark, the court of appeals noted that
since Louboutin's mark was a registered mark, the district court was
correct in its finding that Louboutin's mark was entitled to a statutory
presumption of validity.12 However, the court of appeals determined
the district court erred in finding that YSL rebutted the presumption of
validity.'23 Even still, the court of appeals conceded that Louboutin's
mark, as it currently stood, was ineligible for protection.' 2

112. Id.
113.

Id.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at *7; Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *7.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.

119.
120.

Id.
Id. at *11.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124.

Id. at *12.
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The court of appeals continued its examination of Louboutin's mark by
turning to the issue of whether the mark was distinctive.125 The court
stated that an owner can show a mark is distinctive either by showing
that the mark, in and of itself, is inherently distinctive, or by proving
that the mark has acquired secondary meaning. 2 6 The court noted
that a single-color mark can almost never be inherently distinctive; thus,
there generally must be a showing of secondary meaning with singlecolor marks.'27 Still, the court found no reason that a single-color
mark could not acquire secondary meaning in the fashion industry "if it
is used so consistently and prominently by a particular designer that it
becomes a symbol."' 28
In examining Louboutin's mark specifically, the court of appeals held
the mark was distinctive as a matter of law. 29 The court determined
that the mark was distinctive because the record, which contained
evidence of Louboutin's advertising spending, media coverage, and vast
financial success, demonstrated that Louboutin had effectively created
a symbol that served as a source identifier of the Louboutin brand and
had acquired secondary meaning. 3 ' Still, the court placed an important limitation on its determination that the mark was distinctive. The
court held there was secondary meaning only when the red sole of the
shoe contrasted with the upper part of the shoe. 3 ' Consequently, the
court modified Louboutin's mark, pursuant to its powers to do so under
15 U.S.C. § 1119,132 limiting the registration to where the red lacquered sole contrasted with the remainder of the shoe (the "upper").'3 3
As modified, Louboutin's mark was valid and enforceable."
Since Louboutin's mark was valid and enforceable, the court of appeals
did not address the likelihood of confusion or the affirmative defense of
functionality.'35 The court's holding disposed of the claims brought by
Louboutin, as YSL's monochrome use of the red sole was not comparable
to Louboutin's mark, as modified. 3 6 Thus, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction on the

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *13.

130. Id.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at *14.
15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006).
ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *14.
Id.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *14.
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grounds that Louboutin could not have shown a likelihood of success on
the merits.'3 7 The case was remanded
for further proceedings with
138
regard to YSL's counterclaims.
In October 2012, YSL filed a motion to dismiss the pending counterclaims. 3 9 YSL stated that since the ruling was favorable to both
parties, there was no need for further litigation. 40 In a press release,
YSL's attorney noted, "By dismissing the case now, Yves Saint Laurent
also wishes to ensure that the court will not make any further rulings
that put at risk the ability of fashion designers to trademark color in
appropriate cases."' 4 '
Despite the appearance that this matter was going to come to a
somewhat amicable end, the months following YSL's motion to dismiss
were filled with "volleys of letters" and conferences with the district
court judge as the parties continued to spar, this time over the stipulations that would finally bring the matter to an end. 14 2 Specifically, the
parties could not agree on how broadly the opinion by the court of
appeals swept.' 43 YSL argued that the court of appeals decision barred
Louboutin from ever bringing a claim over a monochrome red shoe in the
future."' Louboutin, on the other hand, argued that the opinion of the
court of appeals left open "a possible future claim based on new facts,
new evidence and/or a new registration."145 On December 27, 2012,
the district court finally entered an order dismissing the case.'4 6
Nevertheless, both parties have indicated that this order would not
preclude future litigation between them, including litigation dealing with
precisely the same issues."'

137. Id.
138. Id. at *15.
139. Mem. of Law of DefsJCountercl.-Pls. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Their Countercis.
Voluntarily, ChristianLouboutin S.A. v. Yves St. LaurentAm., Inc., No. 11-cv-2381, 2012
WL 5338744 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 17, 2012). Of note, YSL sought dismissal without prejudice. Id.
140. Id.
141. Ashley Post, YSL Seeks to Dismiss Counterclaims Against Louboutin, INSIDECOUNSEL (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/10/17/ysl-seeks-to-dismisscounterclaims-against-loubout.
142. Alison Frankel, Louboutin v. YSL: The Bitter End?Maybe Not, THOMSON REUTERS
(Jan. 3, 2013), httpi/newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/01-_Jan
uary/Louboutin v__YSLthe-bitterendMaybenot.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147.

Id.
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THE NEXT STEPS: RESPONDING TO THE REGISTRATION
OF COLOR MARKS

A.

Protecting Competition and the Creative Process
While a per se rule against color trademarks-generally, or in the
context of the fashion industry-is not merited, single-color marks in the
fashion industry are inherently suspect. 4 ' The eligibility of colors to
serve as marks in such an artistic context threatens the existence of an
open and competitive market. The registration of color marks in such
a context also poses the danger that creativity in the market will
decrease and subsequently lead to a decrease in the quality of the goods
produced. There are two potential solutions or ways to counteract the
problems posed by such free registration of single-color marks in an
artistic context. First, the affirmative defense of aesthetic functionality
can serve to defeat the validity of single-color marks. Additionally, the
doctrine of secondary meaning can act as a check on the broad availability of such marks. The trademark limitations of aesthetic functionality
and secondary meaning are in place to prevent broader monopolies on
language and imagery than are necessary to achieve the policy objectives
of trademark law. 49 Still, designers would be ill-advised not to seek
protection for their color marks in light of the court of appeals decision
in ChristianLouboutin; thus, a "how to" on registration of color marks
is merited.
1. Aesthetic Functionality. As mentioned before, the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality can serve as a justification for denying trademark
protection of a single-color mark. In light of the fact that courts have
largely rejected the color depletion and shade confusion theories,
aesthetic functionality may be the strongest defense available that a
party can use when attacking the validity of a single-color mark. 50 An
aesthetic functionality argument is undoubtedly strong. One commentator even referred to the functionality defense as the only true defense in

148. This is also true generally, "Because trademark protection can exist in perpetuity,
this is an area of law inwhich safeguards are particularly necessary to ensure that
trademarks are used to promote-and not to hinder-competition in the marketplace."
Colman, supra note 10, at *39.
149. Id. at *25.
150. Id. at *41. The Supreme Court has even asserted that the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality covers the color depletion theory. Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
at 159, 169 (1995).
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trademark law.151 Despite the doctrine's controversial nature, the
district court's embrace of aesthetic functionality in ChristianLouboutin
signaled that it remains alive. Using cases where the doctrine has
effectively defeated trademark protection as a guide, the doctrine has the
strength to act as a check on the broad availability of registration for
color marks and the negative consequences that may flow from this
availablity.
The United States Supreme Court expressly recognized the defense of
aesthetic functionality in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc.'52 In its discussion of the defense, the Court stated that the test
for determining whether a product feature is aesthetically functional
should be whether exclusive use of that product feature would result in
a "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" for those excluded
from using the feature.'53 Simply put, in examining whether a product
feature is aesthetically functional, a court must determine whether there
is a competitive necessity for the feature. 54'
Arguably, in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in TrafFix Devices,
Inc., in order for there to be a finding of aesthetic functionality, the
characteristics of the product feature at issue must "go to the heart of
the consumer demand for that product.",1 5 The doctrine of aesthetic
functionality serves to prevent manufacturers and creators from
obtaining a monopoly, via trademark, over a feature that all competitors
need to use-a feature that is particularly attractive to buyers."56 If a
product feature is necessary to compete, and exclusive use of that feature
would create a "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage," it will
be deemed aesthetically functional and, consequently, ineligible for
trademark protection.15
Despite aesthetic functionality's power as a trademark defense, and
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the doctrine, aesthetic
functionality has failed to live up to its potential. Notwithstanding the
fact that the doctrine has been around for almost a century, courts have
only declared a few product features aesthetically functional. 5 ' One
of the biggest reasons the doctrine has failed to live up to its potential

151. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality,48 Hous. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (2011).
152. 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
153. Id. at 33 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
154. Id.
155. Nancy C. Morgan, Aesthetic Appeal: The Blending of Aesthetics and Usefulness in
Design Can Result in Challenges to the TheoreticalFoundationof Trademark Law, 34 LOS
ANGELES LAWYER (Feb. 2012), at 35.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 36.
158. McKenna, supra note 151, at 824.
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as an affirmative defense is that courts have applied it so inconsistently.'59 There are splits among the circuits and scholars alike over what
test is to be used for aesthetic functionality. Consequently, the few cases
that actually grapple with an aesthetic functionality defense are
scattered.

160

The doctrine has also failed to live up to its potential because it has
only been used sparingly and some circuits are more willing to apply it
than others. 16 ' Some courts refuse to recognize the doctrine at all, and
some courts that do recognize the doctrine refuse to ever find it
applicable.16 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has used the doctrine more than other circuits.'63 The Ninth
Circuit first adopted the doctrine in 1952 in Pagliero v. Wallace
China.6 1 In Pagliero, the Ninth Circuit denied trademark protection
to a china plate pattern because the pattern was the "main selling point
of the plate.' 6 5 Joining the ranks of the Ninth Circuit, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also acknowledged the
doctrine of aesthetic functionality.' 6 Still, the doctrine has received
great criticism by other courts. 16' The United States Courts of Appeal
for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have rejected the concept of
aesthetic functionality outright. 8' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has questioned whether the doctrine, standing
alone, can serve to challenge the validity of a trademark. 6 9 Of particular note, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the use of the doctrine as a
defense. 70
Still, in spite of the doctrine's lack of universal acceptance, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York's reliance on
the doctrine in ChristianLouboutin confirmed that aesthetic functionality still has some vitality."' In addition to the district court's opinion
in ChristianLouboutin, there are other cases in which the doctrine has

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Morgan, supra note 155, at 35.
164. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); Morgan, supra note 155, at 35.
165. Morgan, supra note 155, at 35.
166. Theodore C. Max, ColoringOutside the Lines in the Name of Aesthetic Functionality: Qualitex, Louboutin, and How the Second Circuit Saved ColorMarks for Fashion, 10'2
TRADEMARK REP. 1081, 1093 (2012).
167. Id. at 1092-93.
168. Id. at 1093.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1092.
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successfully been applied that resulted in the denial of trademark
protection of the product features at issue. As an affirmative defense,
aesthetic functionality is likely the strongest defense available to oppose
trademark protection for a single-color mark. Accordingly, even though
it can be challenging to present an aesthetic functionality defense,
practitioners should still consider doing so. Thus, it is worthwhile to
examine some of the seminal cases in which the doctrine has successfully
been raised as an affirmative defense.
The doctrine of aesthetic functionality was applied in a case argued
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd.17 2 In that case, Mercury, a
division of Brunswick Corporation, sought protection for the black color
it consistently used on the outboard ship engines it manufactured.
Mercury had spent a number of years and countless dollars on advertising its outboard engines. Of note, many of Mercury's advertisements
referred to the "all black" color of its engines. In Mercury's application
to register the black as a trademark, Mercury conceded that the color
black was not inherently distinctive. Nevertheless, Mercury argued its
black still merited trademark protection because it had acquired
secondary meaning-the black color served as a source indicator of
Mercury's outboard engines. British Seagull Limited, another manufacturer of outboard motors, along with several other entities, opposed
Mercury's application. After considering Mercury's application and
British Seagull Limited's opposition, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) refused
to register Mercury's mark. Mercury appealed the Board's decision. 73
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's refusal of
registration. 174 In its opinion, the court of appeals examined whether
the black used on Mercury's outboard engines was functional.175 The
court conceded that there was no functionality in the utilitarian
sense-the color did not make the engines function any better or affect
any of the mechanical purposes of the engines. 176 Nevertheless, the
court held the use of the color black on the engines was functional in the
aesthetic sense of the term.1 7v Specifically, the color black was aesthetically functional because it was compatible with a variety of boat

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1529-30.
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1531.
Id.
Id.
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colors, and the color had the ability to make objects appear smaller. 7 '
Since the black used by Mercury provided these non-trademark-related
advantages, outboard engine manufacturers needed to use the color in
order to effectively compete in the market.7 9 Thus, under these
circumstances, Mercury's black color was functional.8 0 Since the color
was functional, the court affirmed the Board's refusal of Mercury's
application for registration.' 8',
The doctrine of aesthetic functionality also found success in Deere &
8 2 In that case, John Deere & Company (Deere),
Co. v. Farmhand,Inc."
a famous producer of farm machinery and equipment, sought to prevent
Farmhand, Incorporated (Farmhand), a producer of front-end tractor
loaders, from using the green color Deere used on all of its machinery
and equipment. In its complaint, Deere alleged that the green used on
all of its products served as a source identifier and that the green was
commonly referred to as "John Deere green" by those in the industry.
Farmhand counterclaimed seeking declaratory and monetary relief.
Specifically, Farmhand argued that Deere's claims were baseless and
Deere was simply seeking to monopolize the market for front-end tractor
loaders. Farmhand also argued that affording trademark protection to
John Deere green would violate antitrust law."s' Additionally, Farmhand asserted that the green color Deere used on its products was
aesthetically functional.'
Farmhand argued John Deere green was
aesthetically functional because farmers preferred to match the color of
their front-end loaders to the color of their tractors., 5
In its decision of the case, the Central Division of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa addressed whether the
green used by Deere was aesthetically functional.'
In terms of
aesthetic functionality, the court bought Farmhand's argument that
farmers preferred to match their front-end loaders with their tractors.187 Consequently, the court determined that the color green, as
used on these products, was aesthetically functional.'" In its opinion,
the court also recognized that Farmhand would not be able to effectively

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 1531-32.
Id. at 1533.
Id.

182. 560 F. Supp. 85 (1982).

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Id.
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compete in the market if it were prohibited from using the green color
at issue. 189 Consequently, the court issued a declaration that the color
"John Deere green" was functional and denied Deere trademark
protection. 9 °
In a more recent case, Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution,
LLC, 9' Dippin' Dots brought suit against Frosty Bites Distribution
(Frosty Bites), alleging Frosty Bites infringed upon Dippin' Dots' trade
dress-the Dippin' Dots product design and logo design. Dippin' Dots
sold a colorful flash-frozen ice cream product that consisted of small
beads of ice cream. Frosty Bites also sold a flash-frozen ice cream
product. Frosty Bites' product consisted of mostly small popcorn-shaped
ice cream bites with some spherical shapes. After the initial pleadings
were filed, Frosty Bites moved for summary judgment on all of Dippin'
Dots' claims. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia granted Frosty Bites' motion for summary judgment. Among
the reasons the district court cited for granting the motion was the fact
that Dippin' Dots' ice cream product was functional. Dippin' Dots
appealed.192
In examining the functionality of Dippin' Dots' ice cream product on
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
looked at all of the features of Dippin' Dots' ice cream product, including
the ice cream's size, color, and shape.193 The court of appeals concluded that the color of Dippin' Dots' ice cream product was functional.9
The court held the color of the product was functional because "it
indicate[d] the flavor of the ice cream, for example, pink signifie[d]
strawberry, white signifie[d] vanilla, brown signifie[d] chocolate,
etc."'95 Thus, the court held that the colors used on the ice cream
beads were functional and essential to the purpose of the product.'96
Since the colors used on the product were functional, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Frosty Bites.'97
Brunswick Corp., Deere & Co., and Dippin' Dots, Inc. are just a few
examples of cases in which parties successfully argued that a product
feature was aesthetically functional and, thus, not eligible for trademark

189.

Id.

190. Id. at 101.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id. at 1203-04.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1209.
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protection. It is important to note that the product features at issue in
those cases were not determined to be functional because they made the
product work more efficiently. 9 ' On the contrary, the product features
in those cases were deemed functional because there was a need for
those features "dictated by market expectations." 99 Explained in a
simpler manner, if consumers expect their products to be a certain way,
for instance, that strawberry ice cream be pink, then that product
feature-the pink color of the ice cream-serves a non-trademark-related
function and is thus considered to be functional.2 °0 An amicus brief
filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by
law professors in support of YSL in ChristianLouboutin provides some
additional clarification on this matter:
There are instances when consumers have preferences that cannot be
reduced to scientific quantification of performance ("utility"), but are
real marketplace constraints nonetheless. The harm to competitors
from monopolization of those features justifies barring their appropriation, especially given the many nonfunctional words, logos, and other
features that remain available for use as marks. In these instances,
and where the product feature in question does not meet design
patent's novelty requirement, the aesthetic functionality doctrine
serves to maintain robust competition, and to prevent mark owners
from using trademark as a kind of back door to perpetual patent-like
protection for attractive but non-novel product features. Aesthetic
functionality doctrine thus plays a vital role in ensuring that trademark law does not invade the jurisdiction of patent.20 '
It is also important to note that the product features at issue in
Brunswick Corp., Deere & Co., and Dippin' Dots, Inc. were found to be
aesthetically functional regardless of the fact that consumers might have
associated the product features at issue with their respective sources. 20 2 For instance, it did not matter that those in the industry
identified the green John Deere sought to protect as "John Deere green."
If a product feature is functional, it is not protectable in trademark
regardless of any secondary meaning the product may have acquired.
Under the Lanham Act, the defense of aesthetic functionality is

198. McKenna, supra note 151, at 853.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 853-54.
201. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-CounterClaimants-Appellees at *4, Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., No.
11-3303-cv, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2012).
202. McKenna, supra note 151, at 854.
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"independent of arguments about source significance" and "available
even against marks that have achieved incontestable status."2 °3
So what did the Christian Louboutin case add to the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality? As an initial matter, the district court's opinion
in ChristianLouboutin relied heavily on aesthetic functionality, and the
court's application of this doctrine resulted in the denial of trademark
protection for Louboutin's red soles. The district court in Christian
Louboutin did not lack merit in applying the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality in that case. As noted in the law professors' amicus brief:
In fashion design, when the aim is to create color compatibility or a red
monochromatic effect, there is no alternative but to use red. The
question is not whether other designers can compete with Louboutin
by offering attractive blue shoes to consumers who want red shoes.
The question is whether Louboutin's competitors can make red shoes
for consumers
who want red shoes because of their aesthetic ap24
peal.

0

The law professors' acknowledgment of a competitive need to use the
color red in fashion designs provides support for the district court's
application of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. Again, the test for
aesthetic functionality, articulated by the Supreme Court in TrafFix
Devices, Inc., is whether exclusive use of the product feature would
result in a "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" for those
excluded from using the feature. 05 The competitive need for the
product feature at issue in ChristianLouboutin-the color red used on
the outsoles of shoes-is indicated in Louboutin's own explanation of
why he chose to use the color red on his shoe designs in the first place.
Louboutin said he chose the color because it was "engaging' and it gave
his shoes "energy."20 6

Louboutin also noted the color is "sexy" and

"attracts men to the women who wear [his] shoes."2 °7 In addition to
the reasons provided by Louboutin himself, Louboutin's red soles could
be considered aesthetically functional because other designers, including
YSL, want to use the color red on the soles of the shoes they design to
create a monochromatic effect.20 8 Furthermore, red soles can serve
other coordinating functions; for instance, a designer could use a red sole
because it coordinates with the other items of apparel in his or her
collection (as was the case with YSL's red-soled shoes that coordinated
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 201, at *8.
Id. at *14.
532 U.S. at 33 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
ChristianLouboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
Id. at 453.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 201, at *26.
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with the designer's Chinese and Spanish themed collections). °9 In
light of the various purposes and advantages of using the color red on
the soles of shoes, it is not surprising that the district court inquired into
the potential functionality of Louboutin's red soles. It is also unsurprising that the district court found that, in this context, the color red served
"[tlo attract, to reference, to stand out, to blend in, to beautify, [and]
endow with sex appeal," and that all of those purposes were nontrademark functions of color in fashion.21 °
The district court's reliance on the aesthetic functionality doctrine
signals that this defense is not only alive, but also particularly powerful.
In light of the fact that the doctrine is so controversial, and its use is so
scattered, the district court's acknowledgement of the doctrine alone may
be the most significant takeaway for practitioners and businesses with
trademarks. The importance of the district court's recognition of the
doctrine remains in spite of the fact that the Second Circuit did not buy
into the doctrine's application in this case. Specifically, the court of
appeals did not deny the doctrine's validity as a defense; rather, it
simply did not reach the application of the doctrine in that factual
setting at all. If more infringement cases (and courts) address aesthetic
functionality, courts that are not fond of the doctrine may reconsider its
availability as a defense. Still, regardless of whether the doctrine
undergoes a true revival, aesthetic functionality will likely operate as a
powerful check to the threats posed by the free registration of color
marks.
2. Secondary Meaning. In addition to the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality, the doctrine of secondary meaning also serves as a check
on the potentially problematic registration of color trademarks in an
artistic context, such as the fashion industry. As mentioned at length
above, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality is not recognized by all
courts. Consequently, there are circumstances where it will not be
available as a defense. In such circumstances, the doctrine of secondary
meaning may serve as a good alternative to ensure that single-color
marks have met the standard for distinctiveness-a requirement in
exchange for a perpetual monopoly. Courts have a substantial amount
of discretion in evaluating secondary meaning evidence.2 ' There are
212
no general guidelines or uniform tests for courts to follow or apply.

209. Id.
210. ChristianLouboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
211. Schloss, supra note 70, at 713.
212. Id. at 696, 700. "Although Qualitex clearly delineates what secondary meaning
is, the opinion says virtually nothing about how to go about proving it." Id. at 699.
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Thus, there is room for courts to develop stringent standards for proof
of secondary meaning in order to weed out overreaching trademarks that
threaten a competitive market.
So what is secondary meaning? "Secondary meaning has been defined
as the association of a product with a single source in the minds of the
public, although it is not necessary that the public know who or what
the source really is.""
The phrase may be a misnomer, however,
"because secondary meaning really means that in the consumer's mind,
this is the primary meaning."2 14 Justice Frankfurter potentially
provided the most succinct explanation of what secondary meaning is:
The protection of [trademarks] is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no
less true that we purchase goods by them. The owner of a mark
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate
the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the
symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.215
Secondary meaning comes into play during an analysis of the
distinctiveness (or lack thereof) of a mark. In order for a trademark to
be worthy of protection, the mark must be distinctive.1 6 An owner can
show a mark is distinctive either by showing that the mark, in and of
itself, is inherently distinctive, or by proving that the mark has acquired
secondary meaning.21 Therefore, secondary meaning is required when
the product feature for which protection is sought is not inherently
distinctive. As noted by the court of appeals in ChristianLouboutin, a
single-color mark can almost never be inherently distinctive. 18

213. David E. Rigney, Annotation,Applicationof Secondary MeaningTest in Action for
Trademark or Tradename Infringement Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C-.A
§ 1125(a)), 86 A.L.R. FED. 489 (1988) § 2(a).
214. Id.
215. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
216. ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *12.
217. Id. Acquired distinctiveness may also be proven during the registration stage of
the process. Nevertheless, the issue of distinctiveness typically comes up during
enforcement proceedings. Colman, supra note 10, at *32.
218. ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *12. Perhaps this is an understatement as the Supreme Court has stated, "[w]e held that a color could be protected as a
trademark, but only upon a showing of secondary meaning." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000). The Court noted that consumers are not
predisposed to equate color with the source; rather, they understand that the color serves
to render the product "more useful or more appealing." Id. at 213.
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Consequently, single-color trademarks
will almost always require a
219
showing of secondary meaning.
In the event that a showing of secondary meaning is required, the
proof of same can take several forms. 22 0
Evidence of secondary
meaning can either be direct or indirect. 221 Direct evidence includes
testimony at trial, affidavits, surveys and statistical data, and unsolicited consumer response and testimonials.222
Indirect evidence of
secondary meaning includes advertising and promotion, sales and
amount of receipts, unsolicited media coverage, use of the mark by third
parties, and the length and exclusivity of use of the mark. 23 Alternatively, the test for determining secondary meaning is sometimes
enunciated as a factors test with the factors including: "(1) advertising
expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (3)
unsolicited media coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts
to plagiarize the mark, and, (6) length and exclusivity of the mark's
use."224 The weight that courts give to each factor differs from court
225

to court.

In Christian Louboutin, the court of appeals determined that
Louboutin's red soles had acquired secondary meaning. 226 The court
noted that the record included extensive evidence of Louboutin's
advertising expenditures, media coverage, as well as a number of
consumer surveys submitted by both parties. 227 The court went on to
conclude that Louboutin's efforts and investment in the mark were
undoubtedly successful.228
The district court avowed Louboutin's
success was "to the point where, in the high-stakes commercial markets
and social circles in which these things matter a great deal, the red
229
outsole became closely associated with Louboutin."
Again, courts have a large amount of discretion in determining the
sufficiency and persuasiveness of the secondary meaning evidence
proffered.2 0 If courts follow the lead of ChristianLouboutin-requir-

219. ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *12.
220. Rigney, supra note 213.
221. Id.

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *13 (quoting Centaur Commc'ns, Ltd.
v. AIS/M Comnc'ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987)).
225. Schloss, supra note 70, at 704-19.
226. ChristianLouboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *15.

227. Id. at *13.
228. Id.
229. ChristianLouboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447-48.
230. Schloss, supra note 70, at 713, 728.
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ing extensive evidence of secondary meaning-the doctrine can serve as
a check on the registration of color marks. Put another way, strict
evidentiary requirements for a showing of secondary meaning will result
in a limitation of the widespread availability of registration. Under such
evidentiary requirements, only those owners that have "paid their dues"
by successfully cultivating their marks will receive trademark protection.
Such a limitation is much needed in artistic contexts such as the fashion
industry.
B. If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em: Registrationof Color, a "How
To"
Although federal registration of a trademark is "optional," it is
recommended that businesses register any marks connected with their
brand, including, of course, any color marks, and that they do so as
quickly as possible.23' Federal registration provides constructive notice
of the registrant's trademark rights throughout the country.232
Furthermore, federal registration gives rise to a legal presumption that
the registrant owns the mark as well as the exclusive right to use the
3
mark.

23

There are certain requirements an applicant must meet in order to
register a color mark. First, the applicant must show that the mark is
distinctive. The United States Patent and Trademark Office will deny
registration of a color mark on the Principal Register unless the
applicant proves that the mark has acquired distinctiveness."
According to the USPTO, "the burden of proof on the applicant to prove
acquired distinctiveness is 'substantial.' 2 5 Nevertheless, even if the
color mark is not distinctive, it may still be eligible for registration on
the Supplemental Register.2 6

231. Colman, supranote 10, at *28. While there are "common-law trademark rights,"
"nationwide rights can be achieved only through a formal registration process." Id.

232. Id. at *29.
233. Id. Additionally, "[olne benefit of registration particularly useful to the fashion
industry is the ability to record the registration with US Customs and Border Protection,
in order to prevent the importation of infringing goods.

Put differently, the federal

government will not stop infringing goods at the border unless the allegedly infringed
trademark has been registered with the USPTO and recorded with Customs." Id. (citation
omitted).

234. Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and
Cherry-Scented RacecarExhaust: ProtectingNontraditionalTrademarks, 95 TRADEMARK
REP. 773, 793-94 (2005).

235. Id. at 793-94.
236. Id. at 793.
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In order to register a color mark, an applicant must also register his
mark at the right time-when the mark is ripe for registration. An
applicant should wait to register a color mark until after he has actually
used the color mark in commerce. 237 An intent-to-use application is
not successful in the context of color marks because one cannot "prove
acquired distinctiveness for a mark that has not yet been used."2 8
Thus, an applicant seeking to register a color needs to file a use-based
application after they have used the color for a length of time.239
Importantly, during that period of use, the applicant will have had time
to cultivate his mark, for instance, by expenditures on advertising.
Through advertising and other cultivation measures, the applicant
builds a case for the mark's distinctiveness. 2'
When registering a color, an applicant must also specify the color
being registered and the specific location of same. The applicant must
"name the color that is a feature of the mark and should describe the
mark and where the color appears on the mark."2" One way applicants can do this is by indicating the color's PANTONE color number.2 42 The PANTONE color system is a system that can be used for
identifying specific shades of colors. 2" It is worth noting, however, if
an applicant uses the PANTONE color system in his application, he
must also still indicate the general name of the color.2 " This is as
simple as Louboutin identifying the color used on his outsoles as "red."
As of 2003, applications for color marks must actually be filed in
color.2 5 The USPTO has discontinued the use of the color lining
system-a system that used different lines to indicate where the color
was located on the product (as seen in the diagram accompanying
Louboutin's mark).2"
When registering a color, an applicant must submit a drawing.2"
This drawing is usually "a representation of the product or packaging on
which the color is to be placed."24 Generally, the USPTO offers
registration of a trademark in three different formats: "(1) standard

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.

248. Id.
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character format; (2) stylized/design format; or (3) sound mark."

9

The stylized/design format is the proper format for registering a color.
Per the USPTO's website, the stylized/design format 'is appropriate if
you wish to register a mark with a design element and/or word(s) and/or
letter(s) having a particular stylized appearance that you wish to
protect."250
In reviewing the different formats, it is important to note the fact that
the USPTO website also provides that "[Flormats 1 and 2 may not be
mixed in one mark; i.e., do not submit a representation of a mark that
attempts to combine a standard character format and a stylized/design
format."25 1 Thus, a color that is incorporated into a design will require
a separate registration in order to obtain trademark protection for the
color itself (for instance, if Louis Vuitton wanted protection for one of the
colors used in its multicolored Toile monogram pattern, it would have to
submit a separate application for that color mark). In sum, to register
a color, one simply needs to actually use the color they wish to register
in commerce, fill out an application with the USPTO using the
stylized/design format, pay the applicable registration fees, ensure the
mark is distinctive, and specify the color, as well as the location of the
color on the mark by way of a drawing.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the trademark registration and protection of color is
beneficial to producers that invest in creating a source-identifying
feature on their products. Such investment in a source-identifier should
be rewarded and protected. Still, the protection of color remains
particularly troubling in artistic contexts, such as the fashion industry.
Specifically, because fashion is an art form, and designers should have
all of the colors of the rainbow at their disposal. The use of color in
fashion is never truly arbitrary, as it should be in order to secure
trademark protection.
Still, the command of Qualitex and the court of appeals decision in
Christian Louboutin signaled there will be no per se rule barring the
trademark protection of color in certain industries, such as the fashion
industry. Consequently, the only limitations to the ownership of color
will be typical trademark requirements, such as distinctiveness
(secondary meaning), and defenses, such as aesthetic functionality. The

249. USPTO.Gov, Representationofthe Mark, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics
/mark.jsp (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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protection of color in the fashion context is unlikely to be limited any
further in light of the fact that the ChristianLouboutin case has reached

finality (for now).
In spite of my opposition to trademark protection of color in certain
artistic contexts, such as in factual scenarios similar to the Christian
Louboutin case, designers would be ill-advised not to seek trademark
protection for colors they have used that may have acquired secondary
meaning. 2
The Christian Louboutin decision should guide the
direction of designs and branding.2 53 Still, those in opposition to the
protection of color in certain artistic contexts should encourage the
growth of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, or encourage Congress
to limit such trademark protection in order to encourage creativity and
protect the competitive market. Additionally, those opposed should
encourage high evidentiary standards for proof of secondary meaning.
Nevertheless, those in opposition to the free registration of color marks
in artistic contests may rest peacefully knowing that in the minds of
YSL and Louboutin, this dispute is not over, signaling the potential for
more litigation on this issue and offering hope that the Supreme Court
will revisit this issue once again.
MONICA SULLIVAN

252.
253.

See supra subsection III(B).
Colman, supra note 10, at *42.

